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n 1954, Israeli Military Intelligence (often known by its Hebrew abbreviation AMAN) activated a sleeper cell that had been tasked with setting off a series of bombs in Egypt. In this risky operation, a small number of Egyptian Jews were to bomb Western and Egyptian institutions in Egypt, hoping the attacks could be blamed on Egyptian opponents of the countryÕs leader, Gamal Abdel Nasser, including members of the Muslim Brotherhood or the Communist Party. The ensuing chaos, it apparently was hoped, would persuade Western governments that NasserÕs regime was unstable and, therefore, unworthy of financial and other support.
The operation started with the bombing of the Alexandria post office and, within a matter of weeks, six other buildings in Alexandria and Cairo also were targeted. But the Egyptian government was apparently told about the next bombing target, and the bomber was arrested. Eventually, Egyptian security rolled up the entire Israeli cell.
The failed operation became a scandal and blame for the ill-conceived attempt is still not officially settled. During the 1954"55 trial of the bombers, however, Pinhas Lavon, IsraelÕs minister of defense, was painted as having approved the sabotage campaign and LavonÕs political enemies at home echoed the charge in early inquiries into the matter. Subsequent Israeli investigations suggest that Lavon was framed, to divert attention from other Israeli leaders, but the incident has retained the name given at the time: the Lavon Affair.
This ill-conceived false-flag operation failed, embarrassingly, to accomplish its goal of undermining Nasser. Although usually ignored or portrayed as an intramural political fight among high-level Israeli politicians, the Lavon Affair also played a major role in setting in motion a chain of events that led to IsraelÕs acquisition of nuclear weapons, via scientific and military cooperation with France. Narratives of the affairÑincluding this oneÑare hampered by Israeli government secrecy and the failure thus far of those who organized and ordered its execution to reveal publicly their innermost thinking about it. But regardless of the details of how the Lavon Affair came about, the affair triggered events that accelerated the Israeli bomb program. Even absent the Lavon Affair, Israel would almost certainly have obtained the bomb. But the path to it would have been longer and more difficult, with an unpredictable impact on the power dynamics of the entire Middle East.
The Israeli"French connection
France, partly because it was excluded from cooperating with the United States on the development of the bomb during and after World War II, as well as its parlous financial condition at the time, was significantly disadvantaged in regard to nuclear technology development at the end of the war (Goldschmidt, 1982) . However, the US Atomic Energy Commission and its nuclear labs at Los Alamos, Livermore, and Oak Ridge provided a model that was followed by other countries with nuclear ambitions, including France, which created the CommissariatˆlÕnergie atomique in 1945 and, subsequently, the nuclear research centers at Chatillon in 1946 and Saclay in 1952. Meanwhile, IsraelÕs first prime minister, David Ben-Gurion, influenced by his science advisor Ernst David Bergmann, decided to launch a nuclear technology development program within the Ministry of Defense. Bergmann was a scientist with an international reputation in chemistry and professional connections in many countries, including France. These connections enabled Israel to send some of its budding nuclear physicists for training at Saclay (Cohen, 1998) . Thus, the foundation for a future French"Israeli nuclear connection was laid.
While Israel was pleased to obtain advanced scientific training in France, its main concern in the near term was conventional military assistance, another area that the Israelis thought was ripe for cooperation between the two countries. Mohammad Naguib and Gamal Abdel Nasser had shared power after the 1952 overthrow of the Egyptian monarchy, a development that gave both the Israelis and the French cause for concern. Nasser became EgyptÕs sole leader in 1954 after a failed assassination attempt against him by a member of the Muslim Brotherhood. The failure, witnessed by a large crowd that had gathered to hear Nasser speak, made him a hero (Rogan, 2009 Its other troubles with Nasser notwithstanding, Britain shared the goal of trying to keep Nasser from falling under Soviet influence and joined with the United States in providing aid to Egypt. In particular, the two countries agreed to provide substantial direct financial support ($68 million) for the building of the high dam at Aswan, which Nasser believed would be seen as one of his most significant accomplishments as president of Egypt. The United States also promised to support a $200 million loan from the World Bank for the Aswan Dam (Boyle, 2005) .
Nasser was troubling the French during this period as well. Besides being at odds with the French and British over the Suez Canal, which they controlled via their majority position in the Suez Canal Authority, Nasser provided assistance to Algerian rebels fighting for independence from France. The Israelis, who armed and trained militias in the Jewish-Algerian communities to help protect them from Islamist rebels, aided France in the Algerian fight. Sometimes, Jewish-Algerian reservists in the French army even commanded those militias, and the Israelis provided intelligence to the French, cracking the codes for Algerian underground messages broadcast from Cairo (Karpin, 2006) .
Although there were disagreements within the Israeli leadership on how to handle Nasser, Ben-Gurion and his Army chief of staff, Moshe Dayan, were convinced that another war with Egypt was both likely and better triggered sooner than later. Thus, Israel was desperate to obtain arms in preparation for what it viewed as the inevitable and saw France as having a common interest with Israel in getting rid of Nasser.
The task of forging Israeli"French military cooperation via an arms deal was given to then-Director General of the Ministry of Defense Shimon Peres, who was spectacularly successful, thanks to Abel Thomas and Louis Mangin, the chief assistants to French Minister of Interior Maurice Bourgs-Maunoury (Pan, 1982) . Thomas, though not Jewish, was a passionate supporter of Israel, partly because of what he viewed as his brotherÕs shared history with victims of the Holocaust (Karpin, 2006 Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 69 (4) jet fighters to Israel and later followed it up with an arms deal worth about $70 million involving more planes, thousands of antitank rockets, and tens of thousands of artillery shells (Karpin, 2006) . NasserÕs rise to the presidency of Egypt, his vehement opposition to the Jewish state, and his efforts against the former colonial powers in North Africa and the Middle East made Israel and France natural allies. Extending that narrowly based alliance to nuclear weapons cooperation, however, required a catalyst powerful enough to overcome opposition from some parts of the French Foreign Ministry to any French"Israeli nuclear partnership. The Israelis unintentionally provided that catalyst through an improbable plan that aimed to thwart a pragmatic policy decision by the United States and Britain to provide Nasser with limited economic help.
Hubris and bombs: The Lavon Affair
While Nasser was pleased to obtain American help for the Aswan Dam project, he also wanted an arms deal, which the United States was reluctant to grant, partly because of NasserÕs stated aim of eliminating the Jewish state. Nevertheless, Israeli leaders feared a strengthening of NasserÕs political position in the region and a possible US"Egyptian arms deal that they considered a dire threat to Israel. prepared to compromise EgyptÕs rightful claim to complete control over the canal (Hirst, 1977) . IsraelÕs hope was that Operation Susannah would embolden NasserÕs enemies and undermine arguments for Western support. A set of goals, ostensibly articulated by Benjamin Gibli, the head of Israeli Military Intelligence, was delivered to the ring by an intelligence officer about to join them:
Our goal is to break the WestÕs confidence in the existing [Egyptian] regime . . . The actions should cause arrests, demonstrations, and expressions of revenge. The Israeli origin should be totally covered while attention should be shifted to any other possible factor. The purpose is to prevent economic and military aid from the West to Egypt. The choice of the precise objectives to be sabotaged will be left to the men on the spot, who should evaluate the possible consequences of each action . . . in terms of creating commotion and public disorders. (Rokach, 1986: 659, 664) A core of Israeli agents headed by Colonel Avraham Dar, whose cover identity was that of a British businessman named John Darling, recruited and trained the original members of the ring (Geller, 2013) . Operational details, including further recruitment, became the responsibility of a military intelligence agent, Avraham (n Adolf) Seidenberg, also known as Avri Elad. Elad had a positive reputation as the discoverer of methods used by wanted Nazi war criminals to escape to Arab countries; he also had a negative reputation in some Israeli quarters as a thief who had been punished for looting Arab houses. The operation began on July 2, 1954, with bombs set off inside the Alexandria post office; on July 14, incendiary devices were set off in US consulate libraries in Alexandria and Cairo. On July 23, bombs went off in two cinemas, the railway terminal, and the central post office in Cairo (Isseroff, 2003) . There were no casualties, as the bombs were detonated when no one was likely to be present.
It remains unclear exactly how the Egyptians were warned (it is believed that Elad had compromised the operation), but they were ready for the next bombing, planned for a movie theater in Cairo on July 27. They stationed a fire truck outside the theater. In a lucky break for the Egyptians, the saboteurÕs incendiary device detonated in his pocket as he approached the theater. The saboteur, Philip Nathanson, was arrested and interrogated, and because the ring members were not compartmentalized (they all knew one another), the sabotage ring unraveled. Elad and Dar managed to escape, but on October 5, the Egyptian interior minister announced the breakup of a Ò13-manÓ Israeli sabotage network, a number in which Elad was probably included, despite his escape. Among those arrested was an Israeli intelligence agent, Max Binett, who committed suicide upon arrest. One of the Egyptian Jews, Yosef Carmon, committed suicide in prison. The remaining 10 prisoners were tried; two were acquitted, and all the others were convicted. The death penalty (by hanging) was announced and carried out for two conspiratorsÑShmuel Azar, an engineer, and Moshe Marzouk, a physician. The rest received prison sentences ranging from seven years to life, but those still in prison in 1968 were released as part of a prisoner exchange in the aftermath of the 1967 Six-Day War.
Elad settled abroad, but was tricked into returning to Israel, where he was arrested and tried before a secret tribunal in 1959. He was not charged with being a double agent, but was convicted and sentenced to 10 years in prison for having illegal contact with Egyptian intelligence. Elad served two additional years via the administrative detention authority of the Ministry of Defense; subsequently, he was allowed to emigrate to the United States, where he lived until his death in 1993. Although he continued to profess innocence, the Associated Press reported in 1988 that the Egyptian magazine October cited Egyptian sources to the effect that Elad was an agent for both Israel and Egypt (Herman, 2013) .
The failure of Operation Susannah was a shock to IsraelÕs leaders, and none was prepared to accept responsibility for the activation of the sleeper cell, which, among other things, put the 50,000 Jews living in Egypt at high risk. The question of who gave the order became an issue that roiled Israeli politics for more than a decade and is still not officially settled. And the botched operation had serious consequences beyond the fate of the conspirators.
The trial that led to the Soviet"Egyptian connection
The convictions of the eight Egyptian Jews were given much publicity in Egypt and Israel. Israeli Prime Minister Moshe Sharett, who had been kept in the dark about the false-flag operation until it unraveled, provided the Israeli public narrative, which painted the proceedings as a show trial of Òa group of Jews who became victims of false accusations of espionage, and who, it seems, are being threatened and tortured in order to extract from them confessions in imaginary crimesÓ (Speech to the Knesset in 1954; Rokach, 1986: chapter 7) . The Israeli press, and later the American press, picked up on this theme, and days after the story of the arrests and trial broke, the Jerusalem Post, Davar (the Histadrut daily controlled by the Mapai party), and Herut (the daily of Menachem BeginÕs party of the same name) began to compare the situation in Egypt with events in Nazi Germany (Beinin, 1998) . At the trial, Pinhas Lavon, IsraelÕs minister of defense, was painted as having approved the sabotage campaign. But Lavon claimed he, like Sharett, knew nothing of the affair and asked for a secret inquiry to clear his name.
In January 1955, Sharett established the Olshan-Dori Committee, named for its members, a Supreme Court justice and a former Israel Defense Forces chief of staff, to determine who had authorized Operation Susannah. The inquiry included testimony by Elad, who produced a document containing LavonÕs signature that gave the order for the operation. Although the committee did not conclude that Lavon had given the order (finding that either Lavon or Gibli may have done so), Lavon was officially in charge of such intelligence operations, and he was forced to resign on February 17, 1955, while still maintaining his nonculpability.
Ben-Gurion took LavonÕs place as defense minister and shortly afterward became prime minister. A few years later, a secret ministerial investigation reviewed the Olshan-Dori investigative record and concluded that Elad had submitted perjured testimony, and that the document ostensibly showing Lavon had given the order was forged, inescapably implying that Lavon had been framed. This in turn implied that Israeli
Weiss 63 intelligence chief Benjamin Gibli, Moshe Dayan, and Shimon Peres, all of whom testified against Lavon, had been engaged in a political vendetta designed to shift responsibility away from themselves. Despite LavonÕs demand for exculpation, Ben-Gurion did not publicly exonerate him, instead protecting his protgs and the security establishment from the charge that military officers were being allowed to conduct risky operations without proper civilian authorization. At the same time, the government held to the public position that the Egyptian Jewish conspirators were innocent victims of anti-Semitism. This stance was finally put to rest in March 1975 when the government allowed three of the conspiratorsÑRobert Dassa, Victor Levy, and Marcelle NinioÑto acknowledge their roles as saboteurs in Egypt by appearing on Israeli television to declare that they had acted on orders from Israel (Beinin, 1998) . In February 1955, though, the Israeli public and news outlets were outraged over what they believed were unjustified show trials. Calls for retaliation for the executions of Azar and Marsouk provided Ben-Gurion with the public support he wanted for a military incursion against Egypt. On February 28, 1955, Israel mounted a military raid on Gaza, then under Egyptian control, that resulted in the death of 39 Egyptians.
Israel suffered no casualties in the Gaza raid, embarrassing Nasser, who realized more than ever that he needed to strengthen his military if he was going to confront the Israelis. The United States and Britain did not want to arm a Nasser-led Egypt, not only because of his public anti-colonialist stance, but also because of regional considerations (Nasser was not trusted by other Arab (Boyle, 2005) .
Britain and France attempted to have the canal internationalized via a UN Security Council resolution, but the Soviets vetoed it, leading the French to believe that only military action against Egypt could alter the situation. They sent a delegation to London to try to persuade Britain, whose economy would be seriously affected by NasserÕs move on the canal, to join in a military attack. British Prime Minister Anthony Eden would not agree to join a military effort unless there was a pretext that would provide some political cover; the French told him that Israel would provide the pretext. In a subsequent meeting, however, Israeli leaders told the French they would join a military effort, but not initiate the attack. The Israeli government changed its position in return for a historically significant inducement: the French agreement to provide Israel with a nuclear reactor, uranium, and additional technology that would enable the establishment of a viable nuclear weapons program (Karpin, 2006) . Thus, the events that followed from the Lavon Affair had now created a situation that put France, Britain, and Israel at the brink of war with Egypt and solidified the Israeli"French nuclear connection in a way that would help Israel achieve a nuclear weapons capability.
The Britain"France"Israel Suez plan
It was agreed: Israel would invade Egypt and drive toward the eastern bank of the Suez Canal, conquering the Sinai Peninsula in the process. As protectors of their interests in the canal, Britain and France would demand the withdrawal of Israeli and Egyptian forces from the canal zone, under the assumption that Egypt would refuse after Israel agreed. The Israeli invasion began on October 29, 1956, shortly before the American presidential election, in which Eisenhower was seeking a second term. The British and French followed the plan, invading Egypt on November 5 and November 6, the latter of which was election day in the United States.
The invasion was a complete surprise to Eisenhower, who was furious and believed that it would give the Soviets the opening they sought for involvement in Middle East affairs. Indeed, the Soviet Union, in the midst of crushing the Hungarian uprising, issued an ultimatum that referenced its possession of nuclear weapons and demanded the withdrawal of British, French, and Israeli forces from Egypt. Britain and France agreed to withdraw, leaving Israel in an untenable position. A UN vote that insisted on Israeli withdrawal sealed the result, but not before Israel received a reiteration from top French officials that they would live up to the nuclear deal. French Prime Minister Guy Mollet later was quoted as saying, ÒI owe the bomb to themÓ (Hersh, 1991: 83) .
The Israeli"French agreement resulted in the construction in 1958 of a large research reactor and a reprocessing facility at Dimona, which became and remains the center for Israeli nuclear weapon development. Israel and French nuclear scientists worked together on weapon-design issues, and French test data were shared. When the French successfully tested their first device in 1960, it was said that two nuclear powers were being created by the test, a notion memorialized by the journalist Pierre Pan, who titled his 1982 book about the joint effort Les Deux Bombes. But Israel had an ongoing need for nuclear materials for its program and found ways of obtaining such materials illegally or clandestinely from a variety of countries. Heavy water for the reactor was purchased from Norway in 1959 under the false pretense that it would be used only for peaceful purposes (Milhollin, 1988) . After France cut off shipments of uranium following the 1967 Arab"Israeli war, 200 metric tons of yellowcake (processed uranium oxide) presumably bound for Genoa from Antwerp was transferred at sea to a vessel going to Israel in another falseflag operation, mounted this time by the Mossad, IsraelÕs agency responsible for human intelligence, covert action, and counterterrorism (Davenport et al., that result in major world upheavals. In a recent example, the immolation of a street vendor in Tunisia began the ongoing Arab Spring that has toppled governments in the Middle East and is far from finished. The Lavon Affair is such an event; it not only led to war and attendant upheavals in the Middle East but accelerated the proliferation of nuclear weapons in one of the most volatile regions on the planet. It is therefore important to understand what lessons the affair contains for both policy makers and ordinary citizens desiring a peaceful, just, and democratic world. The Lavon Affair can be viewed as a case history in which a small group of hubristic government officials, acting in an atmosphere of extreme secrecy and ideological fervor, put their country on a path toward war, with little or no debate. It is another cautionary tale that ought to inform policy makers of any country of the dangers of the arrogance of power, coupled with an atmosphere of secrecy that inevitably interferes with, and can trump, accountability.
As the so-called war on terror proceeds with its intrusive surveillance programs, expanding drone operations, and secret Òkill lists,Ó prudence and accountability are more important than ever. Have our leaders absorbed the cautionary tales of the past? Time will tell, but the increasing amount of secrecy in government and the increasing number of prosecutions of whistleblowers do not provide confidence in the robustness of the American system of accountability. 
